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This paper presents a comparative analysis of the Evian
Agreements1 between France and the Algerian Front de Libera-
tion National, and the Lancaster Agreements2 between the United
Kingdom and the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front. Although the Lan-
caster Agreements were signed seventeen years after the Evian
Agreements had come into force, the two sets of Agreements com-
mend themselves to comparison in that both were negotiated and
concluded by former colonial powers terminating an era of
colonization.' Both agreements cover, inter alia, nationality, the
judicature, the civil service, amnesty, acquired property rights,
and ancillary issues. The Evian Agreements also address issues
such as trade, economic cooperation, education, and military bases.
Although this paper goes beyond merely contrasting selected
rules of constitutional and international law with the Agreements,
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would like to thank Professor I. E. Sagay for his comments on this paper.
The Evian Agreements were the result of negotiations which took place at Evian (Paris)
from 7 March to 18 March 1962, between the Frencfi Republic and a Liberation Movement,
Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN). They came into force on 3 July 1962, Algeria's day
of Independence. France registered the Agreement with the Secretariat of the United Na-
tions on 24 August 1964. See Exchange of Letters, March 19, 1962, France-Algeria, 507
U.N.T.S. 25.
2 The Lancaster Agreements were concluded at the close of a constitutional conference
held at Lancaster House (London), from 10 September to 21 December 1979, between the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and a Liberation Movement, the
Zimbabwean Patriotic Front (PF). (The illegal Rhodesian regime on 18 April 1980, Zim-
babwe's Independence day. Lancaster Agreements, Nov. 22, 1979; Zimbabwe Rhodesia-
United Kingdom, 19 I.L.M. 387 (March 1980).
' The historical forces that molded the events in Algeria and Zimbabwe have been well
documented. For the limited purposes of this paper, a brief restatement of the facts of
the two cases will suffice. Algeria and Zimbabwe, together with Kenya, South Africa and,
since the end of World War One, Namibia, were founded as Settlement Colonies and have
become so notorious as to warrant judicial recognition. (One may add to this list Angola,
Mozambique and Guinea Bissau). Largely because of this factor, the colonized peoples of
these countries have had to wage and, in South Africa and Namibia, are still waging wars
of national liberation against governments controlled by settlers and, or, by their descen-
dants. Both the Evian and Lancaster Agreements were precipitated by wars of national
liberation in Algeria and Zimbabwe respectively. It is interesting to note, at this starting
point in comparative analysis, that the first of the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front forces were
trained in Algeria, by the FLN, soon after independence in 1962.
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its aims are modest. The analysis attempts to reveal and review
the philosophical bases for the retention of key colonial institu-
tions and the incorporation of certain legal concepts into the
Agreements. This paper examines the constitutional, and in cer-
tain respects the colonial international, law embedded in the various
policies pursued by France and the United Kingdom, as it was these
policies which marked the development, and after the Agreements
the abandonment, of colonialism. Both the spirit and letter of these
Agreements are assessed, along with the changes brought to the
legal orders of Algeria and Zimbabwe. The Agreements are viewed
in light of contemporary norms of international law, but the issue
is not raised as to whether the Agreements, as Devolution
Agreements" are in law to be registered as international
agreements in accordance with article 102 of the United Nations
Charter. The paper does address the issue of the Agreements'
conformance with the "Vienna Conventions on Succession of States
in Respect of Treaties."'
The International Law Commission has made an incisive observation:
Devolution treaties may be a disguised means of maintaining a colonial relation-
ship contrary to international law. It will be necessary to consider whether the
consent of the former colonies to these treaties was an expression of their free
will or the price paid for their emancipation. If a devolution treaty so limits the
sovereignty of a new State that the relationship it creates does not differ substan-
tially from the former colonial relationship (unequal treaties), the treaty in ques-
tion will violate the rule of international law which prohibits colonialism in all
its forms and manifestations and is therefore void or voidable.
Report of the 20th Session, [1968] 2 V. B. INT'L L. COMM'N 219, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1968/Add.1.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 102, para. 1.
The preamble reads, in part:
Having in mind the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of
the United Nations, such as the principles of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, of the sovereign equality and independence of all States, of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of States. ...
Article 16 then provides:
A newly independent State is not bound to maintain in force, or to become a
party to, any treaty by reason only of the fact that at the date of the succession
of States the treaty was in force in respect of the territory to which the succes-
sion of states relates.
Furthermore, when one considers Article 8(1), the legal validity of the Evian and Lan-
caster Agreements would seem to be in abeyance.
Article 8(1) provides:
The obligation or rights of a predecessor capital state under treaties in force
in respect of a territory at the date of a succession of states do not become the
obligations or rights of the successor state towards other states parties to those
treaties by reason only of the fact that the predecessor state and successor state
have concluded an agreement providing that such obligations or rights shall devolve
upon the successor State.
This Convention was adopted on August 23, 1978 by a vote of 82 in favour with 2 absten-
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Many an international lawyer would whet his knife if he were
to recall that at the time of colonization, agreements between the
colonial powers and the colonized people were binding on the col-
onized people but not legally enforceable against the colonial
powers.7 In light of this unbalanced equation, to what extent in
the twilight of colonialism can these agreements signed by the col-
onial powers and the colonized peoples be set aside as unequal
treaties in accordance with article 53 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties?8 Might we not invoke the "clean slate"
doctrine in the international law of state succession to steer clear
of neo-colonialism?9 Vexing as they are, these issues have not yet
shed their full polemic value as the process of decolonization con-
tinues to be a significant feature of international life.'
II. Colonial Jurisprudence and Legislation
Examination of colonial legislation from a standpoint of rules
reveals that it consisted of constitutional law blended with raw
tions (France and Switzerland). U.N. Doc. A/6-Conf. 80/31, reprinted in 72 AM. J. INT'L L.
971 (1978).
7 The colonial powers, especially the United Kingdom, used the "Act of State" doctrine
to place such agreements outside the jurisdiction of law courts. See Rex v. Crewe (Earl),
ex parte Sekgome [1910] 2 K. B. 576; 01 Le Njoye & Others v. Attorney General and Others
[19131 5 E.A.L.R. 70; Sobhuza II v. Miller [1926] A.C. 518; Nyali Ltd. v. Attorney General
[19561 1 Q.B. 1; and Adeyinka Oyekan v. Musendika Adele [1957] 1 W.L.R. 876.
The injustice, and the inequality of states, becomes glaring when one considers the fact
that in the event of a breach of the Evian Agreements, France can have recourse to the
International Court of Justice. Thus, Chapter IV of the Evian Agreements reads:
France and Algeria will resolve differences that may arise between them by means
of peaceful settlement. They will have recourse either to conciliation or to ar-
bitration. Failing agreement on these procedures, each of the two States may
have direct recourse to the International Court of Justice.
Exchange of Letters, March 19, 1962, France-Algeria; 507 U.N.T.S. 25, 41.
8 Article 53 reads, in part:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 39/27 at 289 (1969), 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). Since the Agreements were entered into
by a colonial power and a colony (before Independence, and therefore not a subject of in-
ternational law) it violates the recognized jus cogens, i.e., right to self-determination and
sovereignty and equality of States.
Id. See supra note 7.
, See, e.g., the resolution concerning Namibia:
Resolves that the relevant Articles of the Vienna Conventions on Succession of
States in Respect of Treaties shall be interpreted, in the case of Namibia, in con-
formity with U.N. resolutions on the question of Namibia.
Report of the International Law Commission 2 May - 7 July 1972, 27th Session Supplement
No. 10(A/8710/Rev. 1).
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politics and colonial international law." It is meet, at this begin-
ning, to express full agreement with the oft-quoted indictment by
Latham;
[T]he general law of the common-wealth is not ordinary Law. It
lies rather on the periphery of municipal law, where it marches
with politics, with 'constitutional convention', and with interna-
tional law. Questions on the margin of a subject necessarily stir
more extraneous issues than do points which lie comfortably in
the centre of established doctrine; in such frontier regions to re-
quire self-sufficiency of legal scholarship is to ensure not its chas-
tity but its sterility.12
A preponderance of the evidence shows that French and British
imperial policies largely determined the contents of colonial legisla-
tion in Algeria and Zimbabwe. It was these imperialist policies
which mattered and not, as has always been asserted, whether
the territory concerned was denominated a Colony, Protectorate,
Protected State, or other political unit of the colonial power. 3
It is arguably true that Algeria was referred to as a "Colony"
in contrast to Morocco and Tunisia which were called "Protec-
torates." So also Rhodesia was a "Crown Colony" in contra-
distinction with Zambia and Malawi, which were "Protectorates."
One may well add to this list Kenya" as a "Colony" in contra-
distinction with Uganda, which was a "Protectorate", or Tanzania,
which was a "Trust" territory. What in fact accounted for the
anomalous constitutional developments in Algeria and Zimbabwe
was the presence, in those territories, of settlers-cum-immigrants.
" The unhappy experience occasioned by colonial rule has given rise to the charge by
some African states that international law as it stood was colonial, and therefore, against
their interests. See, e.g., Article XIII of the Berlin Act which provides, inter alia:
These provisions are recognized by the signatory Powers as becoming henceforth
a part of international law.
G. HERTSLET, 2 A MAP OF AFRICA BY TREATY 476 (3rd ed. 1967).
2 Latham, The Law and the Commonwealth, in W. HANCOCK, 1 SURVEY OF BRITISH COM-
MONWEALTH AFFAIRS 521 (1937), quoted in C. PALLEY. THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW
OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA 1888-1965 xvii (1966).
" Attempts to find a firm definition of a Protectorate may prove unsatisfying. "The
simplest way to define a Protectorate is by way of exclusion: if a territory (not being a
Trust Territory or governed under Condominium) is under Her Majesty's protection and
is not a British Protected State, it is a Protectorate." K. ROBERTS-WRAY, COMMONWEALTH
AND COLONIAL LAW 48 (1966).
" Kenya was founded (in 1895) as the East Africa Protectorate and became the Colony
of Kenya in 1920 in accordance with Imperial policy of settling demobilized British soldiers
after World War I. For an elaborate discussion of constitutional developments in Kenya,
See Y. GHAI & J. McAUSLAN PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN KENYA 3-34 (1970). See
also H. MORRIS & J. READ, INDIRECT RULE AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 41-70 (1972).
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Largely due to this presence, Zimbabwe became a Settlement Col-
ony and Algeria a Colonie de peuplement. The Anglo-French Im-
perial policies safeguarded the interests of a small population of
European immigrants by denying the indigenes common law
remedies. These policies molded colonial juristic theory, la doctrine,
and not vice versa.5
It also has been asserted, once again contrary to a preponderance
of the evidence, that French colonial policies were different from
British policies. The French policy of "assimilation" in Algeria was
not materially different from the British policy of "direct rule"
in Rhodesia, at least from the standpoint of the practical effect
of rules. If ever there was a difference, it was a matter of style
and not substance.
Assimilation was defined officially as "that system which tends
to efface all differences between the colonies and the mother-land,
and which views the colonies simply asa prolongation of the mother
country beyond the seas."' 6 Thus within the context of colonial
jurisprudence and legislation, a French holiday-maker standing on
the beach at Gibraltar would gaze at Algeria, across the Strait,
as Overseas France. Consequently, Algeria fell outside the jurisdic-
tion of the French Ministry of Colonies and remained ad-
ministratively under the control of the Ministry of Interior."
The British policy of "direct rule" in Zimbabwe (as contrasted
with "indirect rule" employed in, for example, Uganda and Nigeria)
approximated "imperial control,"' 8 which compares favorably with
"assimilation" in Algeria. Zimbabwe, having been colonized by the
," In Zimbabwe and Algeria (as well as many other colonized African states) imperial
legislation was enacted by the executive and took the form of orders-in-council and ar-
restes which belonged to the species of ordonnance et dcret-loi.
," Isaac Report to Congress of 1889, as quoted in S. ROBERTS, THE HISTORY OF FRENCH
COLONIAL POLICY 1870-1925, at 67 (1963). The language barrier, which is largely the result
of demarcation between Overseas France and the Crown Colony, has persisted in these
pages. I have had to rely on English, instead of French, works on French colonialism in
Algeria. Use of original French sources, I submit, could have probably eliminated the mild-
ly condescending trace of what one might call English nationalism, and could have made
this analysis more assiduous.
'" Assimilation has to be viewed in contrast with another species of French colonial policy,
"association" (or more appropriately, collaboration) which was applied largely in West Africa.
The policy of assimilation, like its British counterpart, indirect rule, provided that even
though the colony was carved out for the economic benefit of France, the colonial power
had a duty to help the colonized people develop their institutions. In law, the difference
between assimilation and association was the progressive constitutional developments
towards self-government in the latter. See Robinson, The Public Law of Overseas France
Since the War, 32 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 37-56 (1950).
"S For a detailed discussion of the constitutional developments, see C. PALLEY, THE CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA. 1888-1965 (1966).
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multinational British South Africa Company (BSACO), later was
placed under imperial control. The settler minority then was
granted self-government in 1923. The similarities between assimila-
tion in Algeria and imperial control in Rhodesia are more apparent
when one considers the legal position of the indigenes as compared
to that of the settlers-cum-immigrants. In French colonial
jurisprudence and legislation the law in relation to indigenes was
a branch of "native policy."19 Its administration was a political mat-
ter, aimed at uplifting the indigenes, after qualification, to (higher)
French civilization. They thus would obtain civil rights as French-
men of African-Arab descent. A grant of citizenship to a native
Algerian at first meant renunciation of his Islamic personal law.
However, even after a 1946 amendment to allow retention by
Moslems of their personal law, the majority of Algerians remained
faithful to Islam and did not become French citizens. °
In this respect, Algerian" indigenes occupied a legal position
similar to their Zimbabwean counterparts who could not avail
themselves of common law remedies in the face of hostile colonial
legislation. After the grant of "self-government" to the immigrants,
Britain retained a veto over colonial legislation affecting the in-
digenes. In practice, however, that constitutional power was never
exercised effectively by Britain. 1
In summary form, this was the way imperial policies determined
the contents of legislation in the development of colonial legal
orders in Algeria and Rhodesia. When wars of national liberation
forced France and Britain to reappraise their colonial policies, they
adopted policies the implementation of which marked the aban-
donment of colonialism and the colonial legal orders.
In certain aspects the Evian and Lancaster Agreements are
vulnerable to the charge that they do not respect recent trends
in contemporary international law. For example, one of the primary
goals of instutitionalizing colonial legal orders was to establish and
maintain a monopoly in trade. A Berlin Act signatory had the
"obligation to establish and maintain in the territories occupied
by it, or taken under its protection, an authority sufficient to en-
sure the maintenance of peace, the administration of justice, respect
for rights acquired, and, in the case of necessity, freedom of
11 M. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM, AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS.
197 (1975).
2' Id. at 204.
21 C. PALLEY, supra note 18, at 236, 238, 270-71.
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commerce."' Viewed from this position, not much has been altered
with the advent of decolonization. The Evian Agreements, for in-
stance, secure for France a monopoly of mining rights in petroleum
hydrocarbons. The Agreements provide that:
French interests will be assured, in particular, through the exer-
cise, in accordance with the rules of the Sahara Petroleum Code
as it exists at present of rights attaching to mining entitlements
issued by France.'
The Agreements covered, inter alia, amnesty, vested property
rights, citizenship, civil service and the judicature. The aims were
two-fold: to safeguard the rights of minorities and retain the col-
onial state apparatus, l'ordre public colonial. It is, however, paradox-
ical that the full strengths of French Civil Law and English Com-
mon Law were to be exerted only at independence and thereafter.
III. Pre-Independence Arrangements
The striking similarities and, in some respects, dissimilarities,"
of the Evian and Lancaster Agreements are found not only in their
substantive provisions but in certain pre-independence ar-
rangements. The pre-independence arrangements were necessary
in both cases for the implementation of a cease-fire and the subse-
quent conduct of "free and fair" elections. As conduits these ar-
rangements were to ensure peace, order, and minimum disruption
of the l'ordre public colonial.
The Lancaster Agreements envisaged an interim administration
headed by a British Governor with unlimited legislative, judicial
n H. MORRIS & J. READ, supra note 14, at 43 (quoting S. CROWE, THE BERLIN WEST AFRICAN
CONFERENCE 1884-1885, at 187 (1942)).
" For details, see "Declaration of Principles on Cooperation for the Exploitation of the
Wealth of the Saharan Subsoil," Exchange of Letters, supra note 1, at 65.
2 As part of the process of implementing the recognized principle of right to self-
determination in international law, the French Government, unlike its British counterpart,
organized a referendum at which the French people had to vote on whether or not the
Algerian people, like the French themselves, should govern themselves. Paragraph 1 of
the General Declaration of the Evian Agreements reads as follows:
The French people by the referendum of 8 January 1961, recognized the right
of the Algerians to choose, through a vote by direct and universal suffrage, their
political destiny in relation to the French Republic.
If one adopts one canon of interpretation, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, it means
that the economic destiny of Algeria was left firmly in the hands of France. This much
is in evidence throughout the Agreements, especially in "Declaration of Principles on Co-
operation for the Exploitation of the Wealth of the Saharan Subsoil." Exchange of Letters,
supra note 1, at 65.
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and executive powers."5 The Provisional Executive in Algeria was
an Algerian President with only limited administrative powers.
The High Commissioner, representing the French Republic, was
the "depository of the powers of the Republic of Algeria, particu-
larly in matters of defense, security and the maintenance of law
and order in the last resort."' Unlike the British Governor in Zim-
babwe, the Provisional Executive in Algeria could "direct the ad-
ministration of Algeria," and had the task of "admitting Algerians
to positions in the various branches of that administration." 7 The
British Governor had no such powers, as in the words of the
Lancaster Agreements the "pre-independence period should not
be concerned with the remodeling of the institutions of govern-
ment."2
The Evian Agreements provided for establishment during the
transition period of a Court of Law and Order, which consisted
of an equal number of European and Moslem judges.' The Lan-
caster Agreements provided for retention of the colonial judiciary.'
Apart from mere representation on the Election and Cease-fire
Commissions, the African majority had no significant role to play
in the interim administration. Rhodesian Ministries were respon-
sible for day to day administration.
Both Agreements had provisions for the return of war refugees
and other displaced persons from neighboring countries. The Evian
Agreements clearly tied the vote on self-determination in Algeria
to the burden of cooperation with France. Having stated categoric-
ally in the General Declaration that the independence of Algeria
in cooperation with France was the solution for which the situa-
tion called," it then declared:
25 It may not be cynical for one to note that the British Governor, Lord Soames, was
the British Ambassador to France when the Evian Agreements were negotiated and signed.
From his record of performance in office, Lord Soames had certainly learned lessons from
the French experience in Algeria, and his appointment seemed apposite.
2" Exchange of Letters, supra note 1, at 33.
27 Id.
2' Lancaster Agreements, supra note 2, at 398.
Exchange of Letters, supra note 1, at 33.
o Lancaster Agreements, supra note 2, at 396. The colonial judiciary consisted of judges
appointed by the Rhodesian government. Even on the day of Independence, the Prime
Minister-elect, was sworn in by Chief Justice Hector McDonald. See Smiley, Southern Africa,
Zimbabwe and the Rise of Robert Mugabe, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 1060 (1980).
31
Since the formation, after self-determination, of an independent and sovereign
State appears to be in line with the realities of the Algerian situation and, in
these circumstances, co-operation between France and Algeria corresponds to
the interests of the two countries, the French Government considers, together
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The vote on self-determination will enable the electors to make
known whether they wish that Algeria should be independent and,
in that case, whether they wish that France and Algeria should
co-operate under the conditions defined by the present
Declarations.3"
In such a situation, as provided for under the Evian Agreements,
a vote for self-determination meant a "yes" vote for economic
cooperation with the French Republic. In the view of the French
Government, the independence of Algeria and its future economic
cooperation with the French Republic were delivered hand in hand.
The Lancaster Agreements, on the other hand, more adroitly
tied constitutional guarantees to election of Members of Parlia-
ment. Zimbabwean voters were asked to choose their leaders and
not whether Zimbabwe should be independent. The purpose of the
elections was a peaceful competition for power' with the Gover-
nor as midwife, thus avoiding the grim uncertainties of the
caesarean alternative of civil war. However, there were no economic
cooperation agreements attached to the independence constitution.
IV. Amnesty
The amnesty issue is an important feature of both the Evian
and Lancaster Agreements because they were negotiated
settlements.34 The issue is more exacting in the case of Zimbabwe
due to the rather unusual and de jure constitutional developments
in that country.
In Zimbabwe, the amnesty covers "any act (including any act
by way of conspiracy or incitement) preparatory or incidental to
the purported declaration of independence and of the later Rhode-
with the F.I.N., that the independence of Algeria in co-operation with France
is the solution for which the situation calls. The Government and the F.I.N. have
therefore defined this solution, by mutual agreement, in Declarations which will
be submitted to the electors for approval at the time of the vote on
self-determination.
Exchange of Letters, supra note 1, at 31.
When one reads the above cited section of the Declaration in conjunction with the first
paragraph of the same Declaration (see supra note 23), one obtains the general impression
that by tying the role on self-determination with the burden of co-operation, the French
Republic had the necessary mens rea to control the economic destiny of Algeria.
2 Id.
Lancaster Agreements', supra note 2, at 398.
In the case of Algeria, the amnesty is incorporated as substantive provisions of the
main Agreements under the subtitle "Personal Safety." Exchange of Letters, supra note
1, at 43. In the case of Zimbabwe, the amnesty stands as a separate agreement, forming
part of a "package deal." The difference in form does not give an indication that the legal
validity is diminished in either case.
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sian constitutions. ' 35 The sweep of coverage is all embracing in
so far as the activities of the Rhodesian regime were concerned,
as it includes "any act which would have been lawful" if the
post-1965 constitutional provisions "had been lawfully made."36
Broader that the Algerian amnesty, the Zimbabwean amnesty
covers acts or attempted acts by African nationalists to overthrow
the Rhodesian government. 7 Thus it includes "any act done on or
after November lith, 1965, in the conduct or on the orders of any
'organization having the purpose of resisting, frustrating or over-
throwing the Administration purporting to be the Government of
Rhodesia." 8 There was no need under international law or moral-
ity to indemnify acts of nationalist fighters. To do so would, by
implication, be dancing to political propaganda that the nationalists
were "terrorists" in Zimbabwe (and "terroristes provacateurs" in
Algeria). The amnesty indemnifies acts of conviction and execu-
tion of those who resisted joining the rebellion against the British
Crown. 9 Moreover, it includes "any act done in good faith on or
after" November 11th, 1965, for the purpose of resisting or com-
bating organizations which had conducted resistance against the
illegal regime."'
The Algerian amnesty does not indemnify past acts of nationalist
fighters specifically. Rather, it provides in general terms that
"no one may be harrassed, sought after, prosecuted or converted,
or be subjected to penal sentence, summary punishment or any
discrimination whatsoever, for acts committed in connection with
" Rhodesia: Cease-Fire Agreement, 16 AFRICA RESEARCH BULL. 5511-12 (1979).
3 Id. at 5512.
" See the rather interesting case of R. v. Sithole (1965) 2 S. AFRICAN L. REP. 29 (1965).
In that case, one nationalist leader distributed leaflets, entitled "Clarion Call to Arms,"
in which he called upon the African people of Zimbabwe to take up arms, including "bows
and arrows" and resist the intended Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The defen-
dant was then arrested and charged with conspiracy and incitement. Held: That the defen-
dant was not guilty of the charge, because the intended act of Unilateral Declaration of
Independence was unlawful. The court could not allow evidence to be adduced to show
that the state was preparing for a rebellion. Those who, after Unilateral Declaration of
Independence, attempted to resist were convicted, and in certain cases, executed. See
Dhlamini & Others v. Carter, N.O. & Another, N.O., 2 S. AFRICAN L. REP. 464 (1968).
38 Rhodesia: Cease-Fire Agreement, supra note 35, at 5512.
" See Dhlamini & Others v. Carter, N.O. & Another, N.O., supra note 37. The Appellants
were convicted and sentenced to death by the Appellant Division of the Rhodesian High
Court, for resisting the rebellion. They then appealed for Mercy from the British Crown,
the de jure government. The Crown belatedly sent the grant of Mercy through British
Ministers but was turned down on the technical ground that it should have been sent through
Rhodesian Ministers who were already in a state of rebellion.
40 Rhodesia: Cease-Fire Agreement, supra note 35, at 5512.
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political events that occurred in Algeria before the date of the
proclamation of the cease-fire."4'
Furthermore, the Algerian amnesty does not state specifically
whether it applies to criminal proceedings only, or to both criminal
and civil proceedings. It is arguably sound to state that in interna-
tional law, the failure to specify whether amnesty refers to both
criminal and civil liabilities releases the state granting amnesty
from liability for the international torts of rebels.42 The Evian
Agreements also provide that Algeria is not liable for any public
debts incurred by the former colonial regime."
The amnesty under the Lancaster Agreements stipulates that
''no criminal proceedings or proceedings in tort or for reparation
shall be instituted in any court of law in any part of the U.K.,""
in respect of the various specified acts connected with the unilateral
declaration of independence. This clause extinguishes state respon-
sibility on the part of Britain. Zimbabwe still is liable, however,
for public debts occasioned by the illegal acts of Rhodesian rebels.
The Agreements provide in part that the "public debt of Zimbabwe,
i.e., all debt charges for which the Government of Zimbabwe is
liable, will be charged on the Consolidated Revenue Fund."45 This
provision is all-embracing and would appear to cover "war debts."
Evidence easily is adduced to bolster the argument that state
responsibility for the illegal acts of rebels rests squarely on the
United Kingdom government due to Britain's negligence in sup-
pressing the rebellion in Zimbabwe. Quite apart from this, indem-
nifying rebels who had committed treason in the eyes of the law
would give others in a similar position vis-a-vis the Crown enough
incentive to commit similar acts of treason. It should be noted at
this point that some aspects of the amnesty as provided under
the Lancaster Agreements violate provisions of the Vienna Con-
vention on State Responsibility, ' and as such are void or voidable.
V. Citizenship
It has often happened that at the time of decolonization, an ex-
colonial power will promulgate constitutional provisions that
4 Exchange of Letters, supra note 1, at 43.
4 See J. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 2050, 2079 (1898).
, See M. HOOKER, supra note 19, at 203.
" Rhodesia: Cease-Fire Agreement, supra note 35, at 5511-12.
Lancaster Agreements, supra note 2, at 397.
Draft Articles provisionally adopted by the International Law Commission (29th Ses-
sion, May 9 - July 28, 1977). 16 I.L.M. 1251 (1977).
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govern citizenship in the former colony. Because Algeria and Zim-
babwe occupied special positions in Anglo-French colonial policies
as settlement colonies, there are elaborate provisions governing
citizenship," particularly the citizenship of former European im-
migrants who may wish to make the new states their homes.
Citizenship represents a man's political status by virtue of which
he owes allegiance to one state or another. The law that governs
this sensitive area includes a sovereign right to exclude from a
state those people whose exercise of political rights is believed
by the government to be detrimental to the peace and security
of the state. One might even add to these various grounds (for
deportation) the economic well-being of the State.48
The Evian and Lancaster Agreements contain entrenched con-
stitutional provisions, the legal import of which is the preserva-
tion of l'ordre public colonial insofar as citizenship is concerned.
The Evian Agreements unreservedly commit the Algerian State
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and compel it to
base its institutions on, inter alia, equality of political rights as
between all citizens.49 In particular the State is to supply the
guarantees to which citizens of French civil status are entitled.
A corresponding provision in the Lancaster Agreements has the
same legal significance. Section B(1) does not only confer,
automatically, Zimbabwean citizenship on all Rhodesian citizens
upon Independence by birth, descent, or registration, according
to former status. The section goes on to provide that:
every person who, immediately before Independence, possessed
such qualifications that the relevant authority would, upon ap-
plication duly made, have registered him as a citizen of Rhodesia,
will be entitled to make application in the prescribed manner at
any time during the first five years after Independence and it
will be incumbent upon the competent authority to grant that ap-
plication and cause him to be registered as a citizen of Zimbabwe.-'
According to the Evian Agreements, French citizens of ordinary
civil status shall enjoy, ipso facto, Algerian civil rights and shall
be regarded, accordingly, as French nationals exercising Algerian
" Lancaster Agreements, supra note 2, Section B. It is interesting to note that "citizen-
ship" comes second and only after "the State" in terms of arrangements in the Agreements.
" Recall the bizarre deportation of Ugandan Asians by the military government led by
General Idi Amin in 1972. For an informed discussion on the issue, see Woolridge & Sharma,
The Expulsion of the Ugandan Asians and Some Legal Questions Arising Therefrom, 8 CoMP.
INT'L L.J. S. AFRICA 3 (1974).
" Exchange of Letters, supra note 2, at 35.
s' Lancaster Agreements, supra note 2, at 388.
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civil rights. "They shall," like their Zimbabwean counterparts, "at
the end of the above mentioned period of three years, acquire
Algerian nationality by applying for registration or confirmation
of their registration on the electoral rolls. Failing such applica-
tion, they shall enjoy the benefit of an establishment convention.""1
The Lancaster Agreements empower the Zimbabwe Parliament
to enact laws for depriving a person of citizenship acquired other-
wise than by birth or descent, provided the loss of citizenship will
not render him stateless.2 In view of the recent case involving
a banning order by the Zimbabwe Government affecting General
Peter Walls,53 it is worthwhile to make a comparison with interna-
tional law.
Article 8(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness provides in part:
A contracting state shall not deprive a person of its [sic] nationality
if such deprivation would render him stateless.'
Exchange of Letters, supra note 1, at 37.
* Lancaster Agreements, supra note 2, at 389.
General Peter Walls, former Army Chief of the Rhodesian regime, and later Army
Chief of the new Zimbabwe National Army, said in a BBC TV interview, in South Africa
that he had wanted the U.K. Government to cancel the Independence elections on grounds
of intimidation. The Zimbabwe Government considered his utterances a display of disloyalty
to the State. It then amended the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order)
Regulations of 1980 to bar General Walls from re-entering Zimbabwe. The Statutory in-
strument published in Government's Gazette of 26 September 1980, reads in part:
It appears to the President that it is necessary in the interests of public safety
or public order that any person, whether or not he is a citizen of Zimbabwe,
should not remain in or enter Zimbabwe, he may, by order under his hand, declare
such person to be an undesirable resident.
In reaction to the banning Order, the Rhodesian Front Party (which ironically enacted
the law) condemned it. Chief Whip, Mr. John Landan said of the Government's decision:
Section 22 of the Constitution and part of the Declaration of Rights, provide that
no person shall be deprived of his freedom of movement, which includes the right
to enter and leave Zimbabwe .... There is an accepted international convention
that persons will not be prevented from entry to the country of their birth. A
person seeking entry to the country of his birth should not be denied entry, but
should be taken before the courts if any wrong has been committed by him. Ar-
bitrary action by Government against its citizens is deplored. Emergency powers
should only be resorted to where necessary and not a means of exacting punish-
ment against a person whom it is not prepared to bring before the courts. To
permit the contrary, is to endanger the rights of the individual and subvert the
Declaration of Rights.
The Herald (Rhodesia), Sept. 27, 1980. The Rhodesian regime had taken many such similar
measures soon after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia, and before
the independence of Zimbabwe. Even the Lancaster Agreements acknowledge those mea-
sures and make necessary provisions. Section B(8) of the Lancaster Agreements provides
that "provision will be made on Independence for the resumption of citizenship by persons
who have forfeited it or been deprived of it since 11 November 1965."
5' For the text of the Convention, see 1961 Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTs 427, 430 (United
Nations).
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Unlike the Lancaster Agreements, the Convention provides grounds
upon which a contracting state may deprive a person of its na-
tionality. Article 8(3)(9) of the Convention provides as grounds, in
part:
That, inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to the contracting
state, the person (ii) has conducted himself in a manner seriously
prejudicial to the vital interests of the State."
General Walls had, through his statements, displayed disloyalty
to the State, and had discredited the country both internally and
externally. Analyzed under the Convention, the case would appear
to fall squarely under this provision. However, subsection (4) has
a proviso which reads in part:
A contracting state shall not exercise a power of deprivation per-
mitted by paragraph 2 or 3 of this Article except in accordance
with law, which shall provide for the person concerned the right
to a fair hearing by a court or other independent body ..
It is not in dispute that General Walls was not granted the right
to a fair hearing, contrary to this Convention. Although Zimbabwe
was not a contracting state, Britain signed and ratified the Con-
vention. The Convention thus applies to Zimbabwe by virtue of
article 15(1) which provides:
This Convention shall apply to all non-self-governing, trust, col-
onial and other non-metropolitan territories for the international
relations of which any contracting state is responsible ......
However, the Convention has received insufficient ratification for
entry into force, and as a result does not cover General Walls' case.
In terms of the Lancaster Agreements, only the Zimbabwean
Parliament is empowered to enact laws for such a provision. What
is of cardinal importance in this case, however, is the fact that
Walls was cast into exile by a prior law, promulgated by the former
Rhodesian regime, i.e., not pursuant to Zimbabwean legislation.
Thus the banning order was not in contravention of the Lancaster
Agreements. Quite apart from this, most Zimbabwean citizens (of
5 Other grounds are:
That the person has taken an oath or made a formal declaration of allegiance
to another state, or has given definite evidence of his determination to repudiate
allegiance to the Contracting State. Id. at 429.
Press reports to the effect that General Walls had accepted appointment in the South
African Army do not constitute sufficient evidence for the purposes of this subsection.
56 Id.
57 Id.
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European extraction) have dual citizenship and the banning order
would not, ipso facto, render General Walls stateless.
The Evian Agreements do not contain nationality provisions
similar to those in the Lancaster Agreements. There are, however,
principles that Algerian legislation should follow when dealing with
French citizens of ordinary civil status." These include the
guarantee of generally recognized rights and freedoms and, ipso
facto, Algerian civil rights.
An interesting Lancaster provision permits citizens of Zimbabwe
to maintain dual citizenship with another state.59 The majority of
these dual citizens are immigrant descendants of British settlers
and thus legitimate citizens of Zimbabwe. However, dual nationality
has created many problems and has long been abolished in many
Commonwealth countries.10
The Evian Agreements also provide for dual nationality for
French citizens of ordinary status. It is provided that "they shall,
at the end of the above-mentioned period of three years, acquire
Algerian nationality by applying for registration or confirmation
of their registration on the electoral rolls.""l
VI. Public Service
One of the main colonial institutions preserved by the Lancaster
Agreements is the Public Service. The main role of the Public Ser-
vice Commission is to regulate and minimize, where applicable,
change in the Public Service. It is instructive to note that the Public
Service Association, a forerunner institution formed in 1919, had
as one of its guidelines the provision that "this Association has
been called into being mainly by reason of the approaching change
of government. 62
In 1920, the civil servants believed that their rights as granted
by the British South Africa Company Administration should be
Exchange of Letters, supra note 1, at 35.
Lancaster Agreements, supra note 2, at 389.
5' The issue of dual nationality contributed significantly to the expulsion of Asians from
Uganda. Frank Woolridge and Vislum D. Sharma write:
many Asians shared little confidence in the Ugandan Government, and they thus
did not opt for Ugandan citizenship, if they did, ensured that certain members
of their family did not, but opted for British, Indian or Pakistani citizenship or
nationality.
Woolridge & Sharma, supra note 48, at 47.
" Exchange of Letters, supra note 1, at 37.
62 Association Rules, November 1920, quoted in D. MURRAY, THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM
IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA 19 (1970).
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continued under the new government, and that should Southern
Rhodesia be incorporated into the Union of South Africa, the rights
would be additional safeguards. On the eve of independence in 1980,
colonial civil servants still wanted to realize the original aims of
the Public Service Association formed at the time of colonization.
Appointment in the Public Service is based on merit and experience
in administration or professional qualifications. The chairman and
at least one other member, out of a body of three to five members,
will have held senior rank in the Public Service.' It is this legal
device which gives colonial civil servants sway over appointment
of indigenes into the Public Service with which they had had no
connection during the colonial period."
The Evian Agreements, on the other hand, do not specifically
create institutions such as the Public Service Commission, the
Judicial Service Commission or the Police Service Commission.
They simply provide that Algerians of French civil status will be
assured fair participation in the various branches of the Civil
Service. 5
VII. Acquired Property Rights
One of the thorniest issues during the gestation of the Lancaster
and Evian Agreements was acquired property rights. The total
protection of acquired property rights requires preservation of l'or-
dre public colonial, especially as regards immovable property. In
both Algeria and Zimbabwe, the acquisition of land at the time
of colonization was, though illegitimate, absolutely necessary for
the settlement of immigrants. This left the indigenes with little
or no land."
The Evian Agreements fully protect acquired property rights.
Article 12 provides:
Algeria will ensure without any discrimination the free and
peaceful enjoyment of patrimonial rights acquired on its territory
'3 Lancaster Agreements, supra note 2, at 393.
, The overworked and battered colonial argument, that the retention of colonial civil
servants was in the interests of efficiency in administration was dangled like a carrot before
the Patriotic Front delegation at Lancaster. There is no tangible evidence, apart from racial
prejudice, which shows that the entry of qualified indigenes through the front door would
precipitate the exit of efficiency through the back door.
" See Exchange of Letters, supra note 1, at 37.
" See In re Southern Rhodesia 1919 A.C. 211, in which it was held that the indigenes
had no rights in land. In the view of the colonial settlers, the indigenes' rights in land
were no more permanent than those enjoyed by local giraffes.
168 [Vol. 12:153
DECOLONIZATION AGREEMENTS
before self-determination. No one will be deprived of these rights
without fair compensation previously determined."'
This means it is the landlord-who must fix the price lest the sale
become legally impossible, even if the government urgently re-
quires the land for resettlement of war-displaced persons or
economic development.
Finally, "Algeria shall guarantee the interests of France and the
rights acquired by individuals and legal entities under the condi-
tions established by the present Declarations. In exchange, France
will grant Algeria technical and cultural assistance and will con-
tribute preferential financial aid for its economic and social
development."68
The Lancaster Agreements equally protect vested property
rights, but permit certain derogations. The Zimbabwean Govern-
ment may acquire under-utilized land for agricultural purposes,
provided there is prompt payment of adequate compensation. Com-
pensation paid in respect of loss of land to Zimbabwean landowners
no longer residing within that country, within a reasonable time,
will be remittable to any country outside Zimbabwe, free from
any deduction, tax, or charge in respect of its remission. 9
VIII. The Judicature"°
The provisions that govern the judicature in Zimbabwe are
stringent, and guarantee the tenure of office of judges appointed
by the illegal Rhodesian regime. Appointment to the judicature
is governed by the Judicial Service Commission in a fashion similar
to the Public Service Commission.
The Evian Agreements, on the other hand, envisage a Court
of Guarantees consisting of four judges, two of whom shall be of
ordinary civil status. The Court of Guarantees is a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction in so far as the Evian Agreements are concerned.
The decisions of this court are final.
The Court of Guarantees has jurisdiction over disputes arising
under the Evian Agreements between the Algerian Government
and French citizens exercising Algerian civil rights. Disputes be-
tween France and Algeria over the same Agreements may be re-
Exchange of Letters, supra note 1, at 63.
Exchange of Letters, supra note 1, at 37.
09 Lancaster Agreements, supra note 2, at 390.
70 Lancaster Agreements, supra note 2, at 396.
" Exchange of Letters, supra note 1, at 51-53.
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solved by the International Court of Justice. France also may plead
the claims of its citizens before that Court.
IX. Conclusion
International law has cast off the old mold. State practice shows
that it is no longer possible in international law for ex-colonial
powers to sign Treaties of Cooperation with newly independent
States under the guise of Devolution Agreements or Minority
Safeguards. Such agreements create new forms of colonial
dependence, are invariably unequal, and violate one of the basic
principles of international law, the right to self-determination.
The Lancaster Agreements, signed seventeen years after the
Evian Agreements came into force, seem to have avoided (or
perhaps kept out of view) the more obvious hardships of the earlier
Declaration such as military bases, economic and technical coopera-
tion, etc.
It is reassuring to note that, in so far as Namibia is concerned,
the General Assembly of the United Nations has resolved that
South Africa will not be considered a predecessor State and the
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties
shall be interpreted in conformity with United Nations resolutions
on the territory. The "clean slate" doctrine in international law
should be given practical effect. The newly independent State, like
a newborn baby, should be delivered without clothes.
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